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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술저널
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2005.9
- 수록면
- 73 - 108 (36page)
이용수
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
On February 10, 2005, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially declared that it possessed nuclear weapons. The North Korean declaration further aggravated the possibility of resuming the Six-party Talks which already has been deadlocked since June 2004. North Korean intentions for that declaration were evaluated as: (a) to increase its bargaining leverage in dealing with the U.S.; (b) to abolish the Six-party Talks and bring a new negotiation mechanism; and (c) to fix its possession of nuclear weapon as a fait accompli.
After the declaration, South Korea and other related-countries made various diplomatic efforts to induce North Korea to the Six-party Talks. As a result, the fourth Six-party Talks resumed in Beijing on August 26, 2005, but adjourned in 13 days with no agreement. The core issue at the fourth Six-party Talks were focused on the scope of abolishment on the North Korean nuclear program and North Korea's rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purpose. The U.S. maintained that if North Korea abolish all nuclear weapons and nuclear program, it will provide security guarantee and pursue normalization of the relationship with North Korea. North Korea insisted that the U.S. and North Korea normalize there relationship and the U.S. remove nuclear threat against North Korea before it abandon its nuclear program. North Korea also maintained that it will keep the rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purpose even after the abandonment of the nuclear program.
The second phase of the fourth Six-party Talks resumed on September 13, 2005, and adopted a joint statement. North Korea agreed to abandon "all nuclear weapons and nuclear program." The joint statement is evaluated as a first step to resolve the second North Korean nuclear crisis, which was triggered by North Korea's unilateral announcement on the removal of nuclear freeze on December 12, 2002.
Nevertheless, it is expected that a complete resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem will take a considerable time. At the joint statement, North Korea agreed to return to the NPT and accept IAEA inspection, and related countries agreed to provide a light water reactor (LWR) to North Korea. North Korea insists that if related countries provide the LWR, then it will return to the NPT and accept IAEA inspections. Therefore, another nuclear crisis might be possible if North Korea would not implement sincerely the joint statement.
In these circumstances, a firm and solid trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan must be the most effective means to resolve North Korean nuclear issue. We may not expect a positive Chinese cooperation without a strong cooperation among the three countries. South Korea's reconciliation and cooperation policy toward North Korea should be reexamined. South Korea's policies on Kumkangsan Tourism, reconnection of railroad, and Kaesong Industrial Complex may hinder peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.
Readjustment of the ROK-U.S. alliance may be a demand of the times. The alliance which was established in the Cold War period may not be suitable in the post-Cold War period. However, the readjustment must be based on the mutual confidence between South Korea and the U.S. Maintaining a free and democratic society and a market economic system is a core value of our society. Based on that consideration, we should develop a future-oriented ROK-U.S. alliance and make every effort to resolve North Korean nuclear issue.
After the declaration, South Korea and other related-countries made various diplomatic efforts to induce North Korea to the Six-party Talks. As a result, the fourth Six-party Talks resumed in Beijing on August 26, 2005, but adjourned in 13 days with no agreement. The core issue at the fourth Six-party Talks were focused on the scope of abolishment on the North Korean nuclear program and North Korea's rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purpose. The U.S. maintained that if North Korea abolish all nuclear weapons and nuclear program, it will provide security guarantee and pursue normalization of the relationship with North Korea. North Korea insisted that the U.S. and North Korea normalize there relationship and the U.S. remove nuclear threat against North Korea before it abandon its nuclear program. North Korea also maintained that it will keep the rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purpose even after the abandonment of the nuclear program.
The second phase of the fourth Six-party Talks resumed on September 13, 2005, and adopted a joint statement. North Korea agreed to abandon "all nuclear weapons and nuclear program." The joint statement is evaluated as a first step to resolve the second North Korean nuclear crisis, which was triggered by North Korea's unilateral announcement on the removal of nuclear freeze on December 12, 2002.
Nevertheless, it is expected that a complete resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem will take a considerable time. At the joint statement, North Korea agreed to return to the NPT and accept IAEA inspection, and related countries agreed to provide a light water reactor (LWR) to North Korea. North Korea insists that if related countries provide the LWR, then it will return to the NPT and accept IAEA inspections. Therefore, another nuclear crisis might be possible if North Korea would not implement sincerely the joint statement.
In these circumstances, a firm and solid trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan must be the most effective means to resolve North Korean nuclear issue. We may not expect a positive Chinese cooperation without a strong cooperation among the three countries. South Korea's reconciliation and cooperation policy toward North Korea should be reexamined. South Korea's policies on Kumkangsan Tourism, reconnection of railroad, and Kaesong Industrial Complex may hinder peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.
Readjustment of the ROK-U.S. alliance may be a demand of the times. The alliance which was established in the Cold War period may not be suitable in the post-Cold War period. However, the readjustment must be based on the mutual confidence between South Korea and the U.S. Maintaining a free and democratic society and a market economic system is a core value of our society. Based on that consideration, we should develop a future-oriented ROK-U.S. alliance and make every effort to resolve North Korean nuclear issue.
목차
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 제4차 6자회담의 경과와 쟁점
Ⅲ. 북핵 문제에 대한 관련국의 입장
Ⅳ. 한국의 정책방향
Ⅴ. 결론
【참고문헌】
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-350-018347686