This study examines the proclamation and execution of martial law from the 1952 Busan Political Crisis to the 1972 Yushin Coup, analyzing changes in martial law theory and the evolution of the military mobilization structure. Unlike previous studies that focus on the fundamental nature of martial law, this research highlights the discourse justifying martial law and its practical implementation. The 1952 Busan Political Crisis demonstrated how even a small military force could enable a loyalist coup. The April 1960 Revolution altered political, social, and legal perceptions of martial law’s power over life and death. The 1964 June 3rd Incident intensified debates on the legal conditions for martial law, and a Supreme Court ruling later legitimized its broad application under the Park Chung-hee regime. By the 1972 Yushin Coup, Park’s government institutionalized martial law as an extension of presidential emergency powers, a concept that was repeatedly reinforced in legal and military circles.
Meanwhile, the military mobilization structure expanded significantly after the 1961 coup. The establishment of the Capital Defense Command and the Special Warfare Command allowed the government to deploy forces outside the U.S. operational control. These units became crucial in both maintaining order under martial law and facilitating coups.
This study demonstrates that martial law was not merely a tool of authoritarian rule but evolved through legal and institutional shifts alongside military restructuring. It underscores the necessity of completing the democratization of the military through legal and institutional reforms. Given the rising threat of far-right political movements, safeguarding democratic institutions through systemic reforms is more urgent than ever.