The purpose of the study is to reexamine ‘peaceful coexistence’ of the People’s Republic of China(PRC) in the 1950s through an analysis of China’s negotiation strategy during the China-Burma border negotiations. Burma was a crucial country in the Bandung Conference and a primary diplomatic target for the PRC, which began to pursue ‘peaceful coexistence’ in the mid-1950s, and was the first country to initiate border negotiations with China. The border negotiations with Burma are of great significance to studying the borders of China, as it is possible to trace the origins of the border negotiation strategy of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) through the analysis of the border negotiations with Burma.
Unlike previous border studies, this study approaches the border negotiations between China and Burma from a foreign policy history perspective. In order to trace the PRC’s diplomatic strategy, it focuses on the diplomatic documents of the Central Committee of the CCP, especially the records of Zhou Enlai. It also analyzes the materials of Burma to determine Burma’s initiative. Finally, this study also looks at the materials from international organizations and other countries such as the United States, South Korea, Japan, India, and the United Kingdom to maintain a global historical perspective.
By analyzing the period from 1954, when the border negotiations between China and Burma began, to 1960, when the border agreement was signed, it is clear how the CCP’s perception of the border changed and how its negotiating strategy evolved in response to changes in the domestic and international environment surrounding China. Initially, China viewed its border with Burma as a diplomatic issue. However, in the face of a global community hostile to China, it gradually recognized the border as a means to preserve the territorial integrity of the nation-state. To avoid international isolation, China began to embrace the ‘general norm’ of the ‘international law’ in its negotiating strategy, and in 1957 added the rhetoric of the ‘anti-imperialist’ revolution to its negotiating strategy to persuade the increasingly ‘leftist’ domestic opposition to border negotiations. In addition, ‘peaceful coexistence,’ which China had consistently emphasized in the 1950s, began to be utilized in the China-Burma border negotiations to protect the PRC’s actual ‘national interests,’ unlike the Geneva and Bandung conferences.
By studying the strategic aspects of the China-Burma border negotiations and the changes in the PRC’s peace offensive policy, this study aims to improve our understanding of China’s ‘peaceful coexistence’ in the 1950s and provides essential insights into Chinese diplomatic history and border negotiation strategies. It is also significant in that it attempts to identify the continuity of the PRC and the Nationalist government through the continuity of personnel.