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Author
(Diamond Harbour Women’s University)
Journal
Center for International Area Studies International Area Studies Review Vol.28 No.1
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    Abstract·Keywords

    The present study examines the role of systemic crises in democratic consolidation or backsliding, focusing on how these outcomes shape citizen preferences and institutional responses. Using South Korea as a case study, the analysis combines Luhmann ’s systemic theory with empirical data on demographic variations in issue salience and trust in institutions. In the 1990s, South Korea experienced major systemic crises that revealed weaknesses in its political and financial institutions, but the stability of its democratic system remained intact. The present study explores whether Korean systemic crises exhibit a self-referential or autopoietic nature, as Luhmann theorizes, and investigates citizens ’ preferences for systemic crises, particularly when social movements lack institutional access and have weak support structures. We analyze data from 1800 respondents using an individual-level field survey dataset to understand these preferences, variables such as gender, education, and individual income. Our findings indicate that the age, gender, income, and social class of an individual significantly influence citizens’ preferences for systemic crises. Specifically, younger individuals and those with higher incomes preferred systemic crises as opportunities for institutional reform. These results suggest that ascribed factors are critical in understanding the linkage between systemic crises and the functioning of democratic processes. The study underscores the importance of examining citizens’ preferences in systemic crises to provide an alternative understanding of democratic consolidation.

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