지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
Investors often vest broker with discretionary power any transactions of purchase or sale of securities. And broker receives a commission for its services.
The churning of a securities account occurs when a broker abuses his customer's confidence by initiating transactions which, in light of the customer's financial resources and character of the account, are excessive in size or frequency. This activity is undertaken by the broker without regard to the customer's investment interests for the sole purpose of gammg commissions based on the volume of trades.
Essentially, churning involves a conflict of interest in which a broker seeks to maximize its remuneration in disregard of the interests of the customer. The broker is most likely to have the control over the customer's account to exploit this conflict of interest when the customer has granted to the broker discretionary
authority to trade.
Courts generally reqUIre a customer to prove three elements to recover under a churning claim: (1) the broker exercised control over the trading in the account; (2) the trading in the account was excessive given the customer's investment objectives; and (3) the broker acted with an intent to defraud or with willful and reckless disregard of the customer's interest. A determination of whether the broker exercised control over the trading in the account involves a subjective analysis based on the totality of the circumstances including such factors as age, experience, and education of the customer. Whether trading was excessive is an issue that must be resolved by an examination of many criteria, including turnover rate, proportion of the account's commissions relative to its size, and the customer's financial objectives and goals.
The object of this article in particular is how to measure excessive trading and attempts to establish more coherent guidelines to determine whether excessive trading has occurred in broker-managed accounts.
The churning of a securities account occurs when a broker abuses his customer's confidence by initiating transactions which, in light of the customer's financial resources and character of the account, are excessive in size or frequency. This activity is undertaken by the broker without regard to the customer's investment interests for the sole purpose of gammg commissions based on the volume of trades.
Essentially, churning involves a conflict of interest in which a broker seeks to maximize its remuneration in disregard of the interests of the customer. The broker is most likely to have the control over the customer's account to exploit this conflict of interest when the customer has granted to the broker discretionary
authority to trade.
Courts generally reqUIre a customer to prove three elements to recover under a churning claim: (1) the broker exercised control over the trading in the account; (2) the trading in the account was excessive given the customer's investment objectives; and (3) the broker acted with an intent to defraud or with willful and reckless disregard of the customer's interest. A determination of whether the broker exercised control over the trading in the account involves a subjective analysis based on the totality of the circumstances including such factors as age, experience, and education of the customer. Whether trading was excessive is an issue that must be resolved by an examination of many criteria, including turnover rate, proportion of the account's commissions relative to its size, and the customer's financial objectives and goals.
The object of this article in particular is how to measure excessive trading and attempts to establish more coherent guidelines to determine whether excessive trading has occurred in broker-managed accounts.
목차
서론
일임매매약정에 의한 증권거래
일임매매약정을 기화로 한 과당매매
과당매매와 손해배상책임
결론
參考文獻
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-366-013558441