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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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In this article, how the Qing dynasty government’s view of Korea or of the Korean situation has changed after the signing of the 1905 Convention, is examined. The primary element that constituted such view was the traditional Sino-centric philosophy which had perceived Joseon as a long-time subject state of China, in terms of history, culture and geographical proximity. Also, an imperialistic intention determined upon invasion and occupation of another country, which was based upon the ‘civilization’ discourse as well, was also apparent in Qing’s views of Korea. The former element led to China’s expression of frustration over the fact that Korea was annexed by Japan. And the latter element led to efforts analyzing the internal variables that must have caused the fall of Joseon, and to arguments that called for the reform of Qing fearing that China might share the same fate with Korea.
This kind of perspective was being generally shared by most of the Qing intellectuals. On the other hand, the governmental officials, especially the Qing diplomats serving inside Korea, did not reveal their personal opinions or sentiments, and maintained a professional attitude, in consideration of the eyes of foreign states, and the reality at hand.
When the 1905 Convention was signed in November 1905, the Qing government, at the request of Japan, recalled the Qing legation to come home. This was because, at the time around the signing of the Eulsa-year treaty, the Qing dynasty was maintaining a rather amicable view of Japan. Qing expected that they would be able to reclaim its sovereignty over the Manju region, when they heard the news that Japan achieved victory in the war with the Russians. So at the time, Qing did not really have any reason to have a particular opinion regarding Japan’s making Korea its protectorate.
The Qing diplomats inside Korea was only worried of the fact that the financial future of the Qing merchants living in Korea might be compromised by the 1905 Convention. They reasoned that Korea becoming a protectorate was no different from losing its sovereignty completely. They criticised the reform efforts of the Japanese Tonggam-bu office, citing the fact that Korea was completely excluded from the policy-making process, and they also criticized the Euibyeong militia movements, arguing that their actions were calling for a more severe crackdown implemented by the Japanese authorities which would undoubtedly appear with the pretense of ‘protection’.
Yet since April 1907 when Russians retreated from the Manju region completely, conflicts between Qing and Japan over the Manju issue had significantly increased, and their evaluation of Japan’s Korean policy, and their general view of the Korean situation, considerably changed as well. Through the incident of a secret emissary dispatched to Hague, the Qing government came to newly review the 1905 Convention as part of the Japanese invasion upon Korean soil, and after King Gojong’s stepping down from the throne and the signing of the Jeongmi-year treaty, they became quite concerned that Japan, when it was finished with Joseon, could turn on them as well. Especially, when Japan started to actively intervene in the Gando region situation, and established a Tonggam-bu Gando police stand there, the Qing government came to perceive Korea in certain negative terms, as a region ‘accommodating’ the Japanese invasion upon the Manju region.
As we can see, the Qing government’s view of Korea was based upon both traditional Sino-centric preconceptions and the ‘civilization’ discourse. And the issue of Chinese sovereignty in the Manju region also served as a variable that affected such view. As a result, to the Qing government, Korea was being perceived as many things, such as a region where commercial profits were abundant, or a protectorate, or an intermediary accommodating Japan’s invasion of Qing.
This kind of perspective was being generally shared by most of the Qing intellectuals. On the other hand, the governmental officials, especially the Qing diplomats serving inside Korea, did not reveal their personal opinions or sentiments, and maintained a professional attitude, in consideration of the eyes of foreign states, and the reality at hand.
When the 1905 Convention was signed in November 1905, the Qing government, at the request of Japan, recalled the Qing legation to come home. This was because, at the time around the signing of the Eulsa-year treaty, the Qing dynasty was maintaining a rather amicable view of Japan. Qing expected that they would be able to reclaim its sovereignty over the Manju region, when they heard the news that Japan achieved victory in the war with the Russians. So at the time, Qing did not really have any reason to have a particular opinion regarding Japan’s making Korea its protectorate.
The Qing diplomats inside Korea was only worried of the fact that the financial future of the Qing merchants living in Korea might be compromised by the 1905 Convention. They reasoned that Korea becoming a protectorate was no different from losing its sovereignty completely. They criticised the reform efforts of the Japanese Tonggam-bu office, citing the fact that Korea was completely excluded from the policy-making process, and they also criticized the Euibyeong militia movements, arguing that their actions were calling for a more severe crackdown implemented by the Japanese authorities which would undoubtedly appear with the pretense of ‘protection’.
Yet since April 1907 when Russians retreated from the Manju region completely, conflicts between Qing and Japan over the Manju issue had significantly increased, and their evaluation of Japan’s Korean policy, and their general view of the Korean situation, considerably changed as well. Through the incident of a secret emissary dispatched to Hague, the Qing government came to newly review the 1905 Convention as part of the Japanese invasion upon Korean soil, and after King Gojong’s stepping down from the throne and the signing of the Jeongmi-year treaty, they became quite concerned that Japan, when it was finished with Joseon, could turn on them as well. Especially, when Japan started to actively intervene in the Gando region situation, and established a Tonggam-bu Gando police stand there, the Qing government came to perceive Korea in certain negative terms, as a region ‘accommodating’ the Japanese invasion upon the Manju region.
As we can see, the Qing government’s view of Korea was based upon both traditional Sino-centric preconceptions and the ‘civilization’ discourse. And the issue of Chinese sovereignty in the Manju region also served as a variable that affected such view. As a result, to the Qing government, Korea was being perceived as many things, such as a region where commercial profits were abundant, or a protectorate, or an intermediary accommodating Japan’s invasion of Qing.
목차
머리말
1. 청국정부의 을사조약 이해의 맥락
2. 청국정부의 한국인식
맺음말
〈Abstract〉
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