This study examines the Gungyehakjodan(軍械學造團), a corps of 38 technicians, dispatched to Tianjin, China, in October 1881 by the government of Joseon to acquire new arms production technique of the Qing dynasty.
The Yeongseonsahaeng(領選使行), a large-scale weapons-system “modernisation” project undertaken by the government of Joseon?of which Gungyehakjodan was a part, contrary to the widely held perception which sees them as synonymous?has been accorded with a negative reputation in the prevailing assessment.
The established view is not without cause, as only 18 of the 38 technicians of the Gungyehakjodan were able to adapt to the training regime and the study team returned within one year of departure without adequately mastering the advanced technology.
A detailed reappraisal of the various factors identified in the prevailing literature as the sources of the study team’s failure reveals that these factors could not be forwarded as a full-developed and just explanation for its failure.
A more engaging assessment needs to be made for the fact that Kim Yunsik(金允植), the leader of the Yeongseonsahaeng, prevailed with the training project, ruling out early return, despite the series of ordeals and discouraging turn of events, such as, the difficulty of having to travel on foot to Tianjin, the inadequate qualification and aptitude of the participating trainee-technicians, illness among the trainees which led to premature return for some of the study team members, the sorry state of financial resources, and even the eruption of an armed insurrection in Joseon, known as Imogullan(壬午軍亂).
It should not be overlooked that the study-team had fulfilled the originally scheduled one year of training despite the various unfavourable turn of events that befell it, and the Leader of the study team returned to Joseon with a plan for home-based training programme which could substitute for training abroad.
The pivotal cause of the eventual failure of the Gungyehakjodan efforts to achieve its stated goal needs to be found in the delays in the planned establishment of the weapons manufacturing factory. This delay had led to other chain of events and difficulties, which saw the ultimate collapse of the project. One key consequence of the delay was the inability to secure the facilities for training and workshop for weapons production. This had meant the newly acquired technology and skills had no place to put them to use. At the same time, it meant that there were no erstwhile jobs for the technicians who had been trained in new technology. As a result, the technicians who had returned from China were forced to go on their separate ways, leading to the disbandment of the core of trained personnel.
The cause for the delay in the construction of the weapons manufacturing system stemmed from another factor which had an overarching impact on the broader reform initiative, which had inspired the Gungyehakjodan and the Yeongseonsahaeng. It took the form of a shift in Qing’s defence policy with regard to Joseon. The shift saw the establishment of Qing’s military presence within Joseon, instigating the abandonment of the overall reform policy of “enlightenment” envisioned by the Joseon government. The disposition of the government of Joseon, which had resulted in repeated submission to external pressures, was a key factor also in the postponement of the establishment of new weapons factory. These factors should not be overlooked in assessing the eventual and overall failure of the Yeongseonsahaeng project.