지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술대회자료
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2014.12
- 수록면
- 253 - 280 (28page)
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초록· 키워드
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This paper investigates government subsidy policy in the context where a home firm and a foreign firm can choose to strategically set prices or quantities in a third-country market. It first demonstrates that even though each firm can earn higher profits under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition regardless of the nature of goods, choosing Bertrand competition is the dominant strategy for both firms. In equilibrium, this choice leads both firms to face a prisoners" dilemma. It then demonstrates that under a government subsidy regime, Cournot competition is more efficient than Bertrand competition when goods are substitutes, and vice versa when goods are complements. However, trade liberalization, such as that via free trade agreements, brings about a change in the competition mode from Bertrand competition to Cournot competition and subsequently increased equilibrium profits if goods are substitutes. If goods are complements, Bertrand competition prevails in the market. In addition, a move toward trade increases not only firms" profits but also social welfare of both countries irrespective of the nature of goods.
목차
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. The Third-Market Model
3. Market Equilibriums in the Second and Third Stages
4. The Choice of Competition Mode in the First Stage
5. The Effects of Free Trade
6. Concluding Remarks
References
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2016-326-001533882