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초록·키워드 목차

This study applies diverse game theories to the US-China Trade War. The US-China Trade War can be analyzed as a game situation because the strategic decision-making process to maximize one’s profit while considering the reaction of the other party is a game situation.
However, related research suffered from some mistakes in applying the US-China Trade War as it is to classic game theory, because while the prisoners dilemma is based on the situation of No Communication, No Trust, No Cooperation, the US-China Trade War has a precondition different from that of prisoners dilemma, since it mutually communicates information and negotiation is repeated several times in a cooperative situation. The result of the trade negotiation will likely end as "cooperate-cooperate".
Further, considering trade volume, trade interdependence, bargaining power based on economy, and the scale of damage caused by the Trade War, the US-China Trade War is progressing with the bargaining power of the US being higher than that of China. Since the current US-China Trade War is in an asymmetrical situation under the dominant bargaining power of the US, it is likely to reach ‘US defect-China cooperative’ in the long run. #Bargaining Power #Chicken Run Game #Game Theory #Prisoner"s Dilemma #US-China Trade War

Abstract
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 이론적 배경 및 선행연구 분석
Ⅲ. 미중 무역전쟁 내용과 협상력 비교
Ⅳ. 협상력 비대칭 게임상황에서의 협조적 균형 가능성
Ⅴ. 결론
References

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