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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
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This paper studies a stag hunt game in which each player’s payoff depends on the level of social norms in a community. First, we establish conditions under which without social norms, there exists a unique equilibrium regarding the cooperation level, but with social norms, there can be multiple equilibria.
Second, we provide the comparative statics analysis such that for a statics framework,the local stability of an interior equilibrium works as a sufficient condition under which the cooperation level increases as the degree of social norms increases;and for a dynamic framework, the cooperation level always increases with social norms.
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참고문헌 (6)
참고문헌 신청
Basu, K. / 2004 / Punctuality: A cultural trait as equilibrium, Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph Stiglitz / MIT Press
Elster, J. / 1989 / Social norms and economic theory / Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 : 99 ~ 117
Ghosh, P. / 1996 / Cooperation in community interaction without information flows / Review of Economic Studies 63 : 491 ~ 519
Kandori, M. / 1992 / Social norms and community enforcement / Review of Economic Studies 59 : 63 ~ 80
Kreps, D. M. / 1982 / Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma / Journal of Economic Theory 27 : 245 ~ 252
Elster, J. / 1989 / Social norms and economic theory / Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 : 99 ~ 117
Ghosh, P. / 1996 / Cooperation in community interaction without information flows / Review of Economic Studies 63 : 491 ~ 519
Kandori, M. / 1992 / Social norms and community enforcement / Review of Economic Studies 59 : 63 ~ 80
Kreps, D. M. / 1982 / Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma / Journal of Economic Theory 27 : 245 ~ 252
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