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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
서울대학교 미국학연구소 미국학 미국학 제36권 제1호
발행연도
2013.1
수록면
115 - 152 (38page)

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This research is a case study that analyses the determining causes of 'Germany First' strategy of the U. S which was the major war plan during the Second World War. As stated in the title, 'Germany First' strategy refers to a war plan that, with a cooperation of the allied powers which Great Britain was a representative figure, prioritized Germany as a first enemy to defeat, and to deal with Japanese threat later with fully concentrated military strength. The research analyses and attempts to prove that the perceptions of decision makers had a decisive effect on decision making process instead of the level of military power of threatening nations. Along with this, the research analyses threat perception based on the study of national image. It is certain that, to Roosevelt and key decision makers, both Germany and Japan were regarded as nations threatening the value of liberty and democracy. However, due to the racial preconception, Japan was perceived as a traditionally untrustworthy nation obsessed with the delusion of militarism and imperialism; in addition, racial preconception as an inferior Asian made underestimate the actual level of the threat. Because Japanese threat is underestimated, a 'wishful thinking' that Japan would wait until the war with Germany is over prevailed among the decision makers and thereby allowed to established 'Germany First' strategy.

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