The target ruling would be a ruling that recognized the principle of preferential treatment of favorable conditions because it would not be effective if individual workers did not agree to the disadvantage of the employment rule with the consent of a majority of workers and would still be applied. And the target ruling may be partially acceptable in terms of protecting the favorable labor contracts of individual workers. However, it is difficult to agree with a conclusion because the target ruling has quite a number of legal problems as discussed earlier.
In terms of labor-management autonomy, labor unions can not only sign unfavorable collective agreements, but also change unfavorable employment rules. That is because such labor union authority is also possible by the principle of representation.
If the actual law recognizes collective consent as a requirement for the change in disadvantages of employment rules, the effect of excluding sub-standard should be recognized if the requirement is duly met. Nevertheless, the ruling became a problem by forming a new law that excludes the application of employment rules that have been effective by collective consent unless individual workers agree.
However, the ruling does not make sense as it overlooks the fundamental problems that may arise in the reality of labor-management relations as follows. That is, first, if individual workers agree and disagree after the change of disadvantage in employment rules, what does the proviso to Article 94 paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act mean, and in the end, individual workers should not agree on the change in disadvantages in employment rules ex post facto? Second, if individual agreements are first, employers will be able to determine their working conditions through consensus with the majority of workers, particularly individual workers, rather than proceeding with collective agreement procedures through trade unions, which in turn will dampen the activities of trade unions that are the determinants of collective working conditions and represent the entire workforce, and ultimately could be exploited as a means to infringe upon the constitutionally guaranteed three working rights. Third, the principle of determining equal working conditions (Article 4 of the Basis Act) cannot be applied to the contract principle under the pure bond law because it is a general principle of the Labor Standards Act to realize the principle of ‘substantial freedom and equality’ under the premise of ‘subsidiary labor’, which is the special nature of working relations, and ‘determination of labor by others’.