메뉴 건너뛰기
.. 내서재 .. 알림
소속 기관/학교 인증
인증하면 논문, 학술자료 등을  무료로 열람할 수 있어요.
한국대학교, 누리자동차, 시립도서관 등 나의 기관을 확인해보세요
(국내 대학 90% 이상 구독 중)
로그인 회원가입 고객센터 ENG
주제분류

추천
검색
질문

논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
Yang Seung Lee (Kunsan National University)
저널정보
한국무역학회 무역학회지 貿易學會誌 第46卷 第2號
발행연도
2021.4
수록면
107 - 119 (13page)

이용수

표지
📌
연구주제
📖
연구배경
🔬
연구방법
🏆
연구결과
AI에게 요청하기
추천
검색
질문

초록· 키워드

오류제보하기
Using a trade policy, government can shift profits from foreign firms to domestic firms. This paper will reexamine how asymmetric information can affect the equivalence of tariff and quota in a duopoly, where one domestic firm competes with one foreign firm. It can happen that the domestic firm has informational advantage against the government. Within this framework, the domestic firm has private information about own marginal cost as well as the foreign firm’s. The domestic firm would exploit the advantage to draw a favorable policy from the government. When the government is misled, social welfare would decline. This paper will guide how the government can extract information from the domestic firm by offering a menu of tariff or quota. Previous studies showed that quota demands information more than tariff. With the principle of revealed information, the domestic firm chooses tariff (quota) if the marginal cost of foreign firm is low (high). The quota level will be high (low) if the marginal cost of domestic firm is high (low). To prevent misrepresentation, the domestic firm should be charged when quota is implemented. When the quota level is low, the domestic firm is charged additionally. This paper can contribute to the literature of trade policy and information.

목차

Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Complete Information
Ⅲ. Asymmetric Information
Ⅳ. Conclusion
References

참고문헌 (11)

참고문헌 신청

함께 읽어보면 좋을 논문

논문 유사도에 따라 DBpia 가 추천하는 논문입니다. 함께 보면 좋을 연관 논문을 확인해보세요!

이 논문의 저자 정보

최근 본 자료

전체보기

댓글(0)

0

UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2021-324-001691499