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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
(서원대학교)
저널정보
한국서양사학회 서양사론 서양사론 제115호
발행연도
수록면
133 - 158 (26page)

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초록· 키워드

Consent theory has provided us with a more appealing account of political obligation than any other tradition in modern political theory. Since Locke’s impassioned defense of the natural freedom of man, the doctrine of personal consent has dominated both ordinary and philosophical thinking on the subject of our political bonds. The heart of this doctrine is the claim that no man is obligated to support or comply with any political power unless he has personally consented to its authority over him. It has greatly influenced the political institutions of many modern states. But there are manifold difficulties inherent in a consent theory approach to the problem of political obligation.John Locke’s political theory is a source for proponents of both individual rights and popular sovereignty. The interpretation of Locke as a typical individualist has long been accepted. According to C. E. Vaughan, for Locke, the state is the prince of individuals, and therefore no more than a Limited Liability Company: the real sovereignty resides in the individual. For Vaughan, Locke is the prince of individualists. W. Kendall, in effect, reverses this image of Locke. He argues that, so far from safeguarding the rights of individuals, Locke sets up a government which demands their entire obedience, and cannot be removed unless conditions become so bad that the majority of the people are driven to revolt.But Kendall, Vaughan too, went too far. Where apparently contradictory views are put forward, each expresses one side of the truth, but falsifies the truth as a whole when it emphasizes its own side to the exclusion of the other.Another interpretation is that consent plays no necessary role in Locke’s theory of obligation at all. In H. Pitkin’s view, the original contract is simply an agreement to limit any subsequent government to act within the bounds of the law of nature, which requires respect for natural rights to property. Then people’s obligations to obey depend on the character of the government, that is, whether it is acting within the bounds of the contract. This view is plausible; but it is not Locke’s. Locke’s doctrine of consent is excessively vague and of limited use as an explanation of political obligation. Still, his commitment to what he called ‘consent’ is unassailable. What Locke sought was a means of basing political authority on the voluntary actions of free individuals; that he might not have succeeded in no way detracts from his intentions.In contrast to Pitkin, R. Ashcraft maintains that Locke defended the natural right of every man to give his personal consent to the government as a condition of his definition of political society. In his view, Locke establishes a much closer empirical link (than has generally been assumed by interpreters of his political thought) between his notion of consent and the institutional practice of elections. Yet Locke is not an apologist for a particular form of government. He does not attempt to establish a connection between the giving of consent and the choosing of representatives. He does not use the notion of consent to make a case for representative government.
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