Research on the effects of board members’ international experience has produced mixed findings regarding firms’ internationalization. This study addresses this tension by examining how boards’ international experience influences firms’ exporting during crises in an emerging market context. In such settings characterized by financial constraints, weak institutional support, and intensified domestic competition, firms become more dependent on external resources. Drawing on resource dependence theory, I argue that the board of directors serves as a critical governance mechanism that helps firms manage external dependencies under such adverse conditions. Using a sample of Korean manufacturing firms during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998~1999, I find that internationally experienced directors provide essential resources such as foreign market knowledge, overseas networks, and legitimacy signals to foreign counterparts that shape CEOs’ strategic decisions to pursue exporting as a crisis response. Moreover, I find that firm-level debt and industry market concentration moderate this relationship. Highly leveraged firms tend to focus on short-term survival and underutilize board-provided international resources, whereas firms in concentrated industries are more likely to leverage these resources to compete with dominant local players and expand abroad. The findings contribute to the literature by highlighting the contingent value of boards’ international experience in facilitating internationalization under crisis conditions. They also offer practical implications for firms and policymakers in emerging markets, underscoring the importance of appointing internationally experienced directors to enhance resilience and strategic agility during crises.