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한국무역통상학회 무역통상학회지 무역통상학회지 제26권 제5호
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    초록·키워드

    This study examines the level of sanctions below which Korea–Russia cooperation on Arctic liquefied natural gas (LNG) can become evolutionarily stable. Previous research has focused on static route cost comparisons and has treated sanctions as an external cost factor. This study constructs a two-population asymmetric evolutionary game between Korean and Russian decision-making entities, in which sanction intensity is explicitly incorporated into the payoff functions, and analytically derives the critical sanction threshold s<sup>*</sup>=min(s<sup>*</sup><sub>K</sub>, s<sup>*</sup><sub>R</sub>) at which mutual cooperation becomes an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). The parameters are calibrated using Clarksons Research data on LNG prices and newbuilding prices, the 2026 Hormuz Strait blockade, and the observed market behavior of Arctic LNG 2 cargoes in 2025, which were sold at a discount of about 27% yet found no buyer other than a single Chinese terminal. Under the baseline calibration, the analysis yields three main findings. First, the critical thresholds are 0.547 for Korea and 1.405 for Russia, indicating that Korea’s condition is the binding constraint on cooperation. Second, mutual non-cooperation remains an ESS at every sanction level, generating a bistable structure. The basin of attraction for cooperation expands from 0% under the current sanction level (s=0.8) to about 68% under partial easing (s=0.4) and about 96% under lifting (s=0.1). Third, since the observed market behavior identifies the current sanction cost rather than the sanction index itself, the current level exceeds the threshold by a factor of 1.35–1.58; under the baseline assumptions, this judgment would be reversed only if the observed discount were below 17.7%. These findings suggest that easing sanctions does not automatically lead to cooperation, and that reducing sanction exposure costs through trade finance, payment, insurance, and contractual arrangements, together with building initial trust, is essential for future cooperation.

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