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What is the purpose of a corporation in the modem society? It is still questionable that the interests of a stakeholder can be protected in the U.S., which is called as a original model of the shareholder capitalism. Moreover, U.S. model of corporate governance is deemed as a global standard in these times. However, the dispute about the purpose of corporation in the U.S. has been continued from the 1930s.
In this article, the shareholder primacy will be mainly discussed: To more effectively avoid excessive agency costs, it was argued that corporate directors need to serve only shareholders. In the argument of the agency cost, it is deemed to be ideal that directors take care of both shareholders and stakeholders' interests.
Then, two traditional argument for the strict shareholder pnmacy will be critically reviewed in the view point of economy and legal practice - First argument is that the corporation are owned by the shareholders. Second argument is based on shareholders' position as the sole residual claimants of corporations.
Actually, shareholder's ex ante benefits can be given through shareholder primacy because shareholder primacy tends to encourage nonshareholder group's firm-specific commitments to the corporate production. Nevertheless, the majority still prefer strict shareholder primacy on the basis of its effectiveness through allowing corporations control over director's performance according to stock price.
Although it is theoretically plausible, the agency cost theory for the strict shareholder primacy has a severe weakness. In the business world, corporate governance rules was strongly preferred on the basis that directors have the power of discretion to stakeholder's group even when ex post expense is imposed on shareholder. Additionally, this pattern usually appears in the first stage ofincorporation. This fact shows business participants I preference for the ex ante benefits, which is related to stakeholder's interests, over the ex post hanns, which is related to greater agency costs.
Conclusively, it is theoretically and empirically convincing that the protection of stakeholders is considered as the main purpose of a corporation by the minority. Also, the long debates in the U.S. provide us a helpful guideline for the reorganization of corporate governance.
In this article, the shareholder primacy will be mainly discussed: To more effectively avoid excessive agency costs, it was argued that corporate directors need to serve only shareholders. In the argument of the agency cost, it is deemed to be ideal that directors take care of both shareholders and stakeholders' interests.
Then, two traditional argument for the strict shareholder pnmacy will be critically reviewed in the view point of economy and legal practice - First argument is that the corporation are owned by the shareholders. Second argument is based on shareholders' position as the sole residual claimants of corporations.
Actually, shareholder's ex ante benefits can be given through shareholder primacy because shareholder primacy tends to encourage nonshareholder group's firm-specific commitments to the corporate production. Nevertheless, the majority still prefer strict shareholder primacy on the basis of its effectiveness through allowing corporations control over director's performance according to stock price.
Although it is theoretically plausible, the agency cost theory for the strict shareholder primacy has a severe weakness. In the business world, corporate governance rules was strongly preferred on the basis that directors have the power of discretion to stakeholder's group even when ex post expense is imposed on shareholder. Additionally, this pattern usually appears in the first stage ofincorporation. This fact shows business participants I preference for the ex ante benefits, which is related to stakeholder's interests, over the ex post hanns, which is related to greater agency costs.
Conclusively, it is theoretically and empirically convincing that the protection of stakeholders is considered as the main purpose of a corporation by the minority. Also, the long debates in the U.S. provide us a helpful guideline for the reorganization of corporate governance.
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-366-013558365