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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
대한국토·도시계획학회 국토계획 國土計劃 第34卷 第4號
발행연도
1999.8
수록면
169 - 181 (13page)

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“Common-pool resource” (hereafter CPR) refers to a natural or man - made resource system that makes it costly to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use but its resource units are not subject to joint use. It has been recognized to represent a social dilemma that the sum of individual rationality leads to social irrationality. CPR situation is often described by the models of the tragedy of the commons, Prisoner’s Dilemma and the logic of collective action, which have contributed to justification of government intervention or the establishment of private property right as a solution. As a result, self - governing regime based on collective action was given little attention by policy analysts. CPRs are not created equal and, therefore, policy responses need to take into account interdependent factors influencing CPR game situation. Policy intervention without considering cultural, physical and institutional conditions in which CPRs are situated could aggravate the problem itself. Farmland Improvement Associations have functioned as a common-property regime for the management of irrigation systems before 1989 when the government cut down uniformly farmers’ agricultural water use fee in 1989. Policy choice based on the short - run political interests changed the Associations’ operational rules and farmers’ incentives, which led to moral hazard in appropriation and provision of CPR. In sum, government intervention aggravated the CPR problems bringing about the collapse of social capital of cooperation for irrigation management as well as the physical degradation of irrigation systems. It makes a vicious cycle that government failure requires more government intervention.

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ABSTRACT
Ⅰ. 問題提起
Ⅱ. 共有資源의 게임狀況과 政府介入
Ⅲ. 共有資源 管理에 있어 政府介入의 影響 - 農業用 水利施設을 事例로
Ⅳ. 結論

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