지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
Financial supervisors should have a substantial degree of independence both from the government and the industry in order to fulfill their mandate and contribute to the achievement and preservation of financial stability. In addition, considering the significant role of financial supervision, proper channels of accountability should be established to complement agency independence and make it work.
Recently two factors have served to emphasize on the importance of regulatory and supervisory independence (RSI). First, in almost all of the systemic financial crises of the 1990s, either weak and ineffective regulations or regulatory forbearances, largely due to the political interferences in the supervisory process, have been referred as major factors contributing to the weakening of the banks, postponing recognition of the significance of the crisis, and delaying official and effective intervention. Secondly, the discussion of the most appropriate regulatory and supervisory structure, including the organizational structure of banking supervision inside or outside the central bank, has highlighted the importance of RSI. The growing tendency of unified financial sector supervision often involves removing the banking supervision function from the central bank, where it had previously enjoyed a relatively high degree of independence regarding its monetary policy functions. This was also the case in Korea after the IMF bailout of 1997.
Korea prior to the 1997 crisis is a representative example of the effects that a lack of independence can have on financial supervision. Commercial banks were under the direct authority of the monetary board (the governing body of the Bank of Korea) and the Office of Banking Supervision. Specialized banks and nonbank financial institutions were under the direct authority of the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE). The MOFE's supervision of nonbanks was generally recognized as so weak and created conditions for regulatory arbitrage and excessive risk-taking, especially among merchant banks, which was a contributing factor to the 1997 crisis. Furthermore, the supervisors had the authority to waive regulatory requirements, which led to widespread forbearance and which made enforcement nontransparent. In recognition of the weakness of supervision, Korea has reformed its supervisory system to provide it with more autonomy and to eliminate the regulatory and supervisory gaps. However, the reform has proven to be a failure because it does not give any RSI to a new financial supervisor, especially to the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and Financial Supervisory Service (FSS).
This paper aims at searching for any alternatives to the current financial supervisory system which ensures RSI for the FSE and FSS. RSI is the goal and task of banking regulation and supervision, thus continuously attaining financial stability in Korea.
Recently two factors have served to emphasize on the importance of regulatory and supervisory independence (RSI). First, in almost all of the systemic financial crises of the 1990s, either weak and ineffective regulations or regulatory forbearances, largely due to the political interferences in the supervisory process, have been referred as major factors contributing to the weakening of the banks, postponing recognition of the significance of the crisis, and delaying official and effective intervention. Secondly, the discussion of the most appropriate regulatory and supervisory structure, including the organizational structure of banking supervision inside or outside the central bank, has highlighted the importance of RSI. The growing tendency of unified financial sector supervision often involves removing the banking supervision function from the central bank, where it had previously enjoyed a relatively high degree of independence regarding its monetary policy functions. This was also the case in Korea after the IMF bailout of 1997.
Korea prior to the 1997 crisis is a representative example of the effects that a lack of independence can have on financial supervision. Commercial banks were under the direct authority of the monetary board (the governing body of the Bank of Korea) and the Office of Banking Supervision. Specialized banks and nonbank financial institutions were under the direct authority of the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE). The MOFE's supervision of nonbanks was generally recognized as so weak and created conditions for regulatory arbitrage and excessive risk-taking, especially among merchant banks, which was a contributing factor to the 1997 crisis. Furthermore, the supervisors had the authority to waive regulatory requirements, which led to widespread forbearance and which made enforcement nontransparent. In recognition of the weakness of supervision, Korea has reformed its supervisory system to provide it with more autonomy and to eliminate the regulatory and supervisory gaps. However, the reform has proven to be a failure because it does not give any RSI to a new financial supervisor, especially to the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and Financial Supervisory Service (FSS).
This paper aims at searching for any alternatives to the current financial supervisory system which ensures RSI for the FSE and FSS. RSI is the goal and task of banking regulation and supervision, thus continuously attaining financial stability in Korea.
목차
Ⅰ. 처음에
Ⅱ. 금융감독기구의 현황 및 개선방안
Ⅲ. 맺는 말
[Abstract]
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-360-016009018