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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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In its ruling of the Murakami Fund case about the determination on the tender offer, the Supreme Court of Japan said that “Financial Instruments and Exchange Act” Article 167 Paragraph (2) defines objectively and concretely the scope of material information. According to this definition, the material information does not need to have a significant impact on investment decisions.
This can be understood as an attempt to define clearly the scope and thereby enhancing the predictability of regulation, by restricting regulatory information on any information that may introduce a significant impact on investment decision by means of determination itself, disregarding the amount of the actual impact. It follows that a tender offer is determined when an entity makes the decision to prepare a tender offer with the intent of actually making it. The probability that the tender offer will take place does not have to be explicitly taken into consideration. This ruling of the Supreme Court of Japan, however, cannot be accepted when interpreting the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act. While the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of Japan explicitly defines material information by listing the kind of information that has a significant impact on investor’s investment decisions, the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act rules that the materiality of information is conditional on the impact it has on investors’ investment decisions. For this reason, for information to be material according to the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act, both its impact on the investment decision of investors, and its probability have to be considered, unlike material in formation according to the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of Japan.
Even though investigations and preparations are made for a tender offer, for example, the tender offer cannot be said to be determined unless there is objective evidence of the likeliness of its execution. Even if preparatory measures are being taken for a tender offer, the condition for insider trading regulations is not met until it can be judged that it will have an impact on investors’ investment decisions.
This can be understood as an attempt to define clearly the scope and thereby enhancing the predictability of regulation, by restricting regulatory information on any information that may introduce a significant impact on investment decision by means of determination itself, disregarding the amount of the actual impact. It follows that a tender offer is determined when an entity makes the decision to prepare a tender offer with the intent of actually making it. The probability that the tender offer will take place does not have to be explicitly taken into consideration. This ruling of the Supreme Court of Japan, however, cannot be accepted when interpreting the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act. While the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of Japan explicitly defines material information by listing the kind of information that has a significant impact on investor’s investment decisions, the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act rules that the materiality of information is conditional on the impact it has on investors’ investment decisions. For this reason, for information to be material according to the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act, both its impact on the investment decision of investors, and its probability have to be considered, unlike material in formation according to the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of Japan.
Even though investigations and preparations are made for a tender offer, for example, the tender offer cannot be said to be determined unless there is objective evidence of the likeliness of its execution. Even if preparatory measures are being taken for a tender offer, the condition for insider trading regulations is not met until it can be judged that it will have an impact on investors’ investment decisions.
목차
Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 대상 판례
Ⅲ. 판례의 검토
Ⅳ. 중요정보의 해석론에 관한 시사점
參考文獻
〈Abstract〉
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참고문헌 신청이 논문과 연관된 판례 (4)
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대법원 1994. 4. 26. 선고 93도695 판결
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대법원 2008. 11. 27. 선고 2008도6219 판결
증권거래법 제188조의2 제2항에 정한 `투자자의 투자판단에 중대한 영향을 미칠 수 있는 정보’란, 같은 법 제186조 제1항 제1호 내지 제12호에 유형이 개별적으로 예시되고 제13호에 포괄적으로 규정되어 있는 `법인의 경영·재산 등에 관하여 중대한 영향을 미칠
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대법원 1995. 6. 29. 선고 95도467 판결
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헌법재판소 2002. 12. 18. 선고 99헌바105, 2001헌바48(병합) 전원재판부
가. 증권거래법 제188조 제2항이 정하는 단기매매차익반환제도는 문면상 내부자가 실제로 미공개 내부정보를 이용하였는지 여부에 관계없이 ⅰ) 내부자가, ⅱ) 6월 이내의 기간에, ⅲ) 자기회사의 주식 등을 거래하여, ⅳ) 차익이 발생한 경우라는 형식적인 요건에만 해당하면 반환책임이 성립하고, 내부정보를 이
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