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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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In this essay, I argue that one’s intuitions about evidence require that only what is true be counted as evidence. I present this prima facie case for a truth requirement on evidence in a few steps. First, I begin by outlining exactly what is, intuitively, expected of evidence. Then, I offer an exposition of two competing views. The first respects a truth requirement; the second does not. After this exposition, I argue that the second is beset by conflicts with one’s intuitions. I additionally argue that the second cannot perform a large majority of the tasks intuitively demanded of evidence that I outlined earlier in the essay. The first view is not met with any of these problems. The results generalize: accounts that omit a truth requirement oppose one’s intuitions. Lastly, I present a case in which there, intuitively, seems to be false evidence, and then I argue that it does not, in truth, pose a threat to this view.
목차
Ⅰ. The Functions of Evidence
Ⅱ. The Exposition of E = K
Ⅲ. The Exposition of E = NPJ
Ⅳ. To the extent that E = NPJ does not observe a truth requirement on evidence, unintuitive facts are true of one’sset of evidence
Ⅴ. To the extent that E = NPJ does not observe a truth requirement on evidence, it no longer performs the tasks thatone, intuitively, asks evidence to perform
Ⅵ. Presentation of an alleged counter-example and a reply
Ⅶ. Conclusion
References
참고문헌 (8)
참고문헌 신청
1. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Brueckner, Anthony / 2005 / Knowledge, Evidence and Skepticism According to Williamson / Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2) : 436 ~ 443
2. [단행본] - Goldman, Alvin / 2009 / Williamson on Knowledge / Oxford University Press : 73 ~ 91
3. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Kelly, Thomas / 2008 / Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception of Evidence / Philosophy Compass 8 (5) : 933 ~ 955
4. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Littlejohn, Clayton / 2013 / No Evidence is False / Acta Analytica 28 (2) : 145 ~ 159
5. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Warfield, Ted A / 2005 / Knowledge from Falsehood / Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1) : 405 ~ 416
2. [단행본] - Goldman, Alvin / 2009 / Williamson on Knowledge / Oxford University Press : 73 ~ 91
3. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Kelly, Thomas / 2008 / Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception of Evidence / Philosophy Compass 8 (5) : 933 ~ 955
4. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Littlejohn, Clayton / 2013 / No Evidence is False / Acta Analytica 28 (2) : 145 ~ 159
5. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Warfield, Ted A / 2005 / Knowledge from Falsehood / Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1) : 405 ~ 416
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2016-160-001317553