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논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 연구보고서
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2012.3
- 수록면
- 11 - 34 (24page)
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초록· 키워드
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Could the recent "food for freeze" agreement between the U.S. and the DPRK make a breakthrough for the resumption of the deadlocked Six-Party Talks and in the DPRK denuclearization, respectively? The answer is that "may be" for the talks, but "no" in the denuclearization.
This agreement has a bunch of pitfalls that the DPRK can run off with the carrots--we have seen the same scene again and again in the past negotiations.
- A moratorium, the DPRK said, will be implemented “while productive dialogues continue.” That means the DPRK can break the negotiations down whenever at their will.
- It is unclear that how much unrestricted access the IAEA inspectors will have to all facilities at Yongbyon. Moreover, it should be noted that the UEP inspection is more urgent and important at the areas other than Yongbyon.
- The DPRK, in its unilateral statement, argued that once the talks resumed the issues such as sanctions on the DPRK and provisions of LWRs will be discussed prior to all other issues. The ROK, however, is negative on the LWRs.
- Most importantly, the DPRK will never give up the nukes. They are the DPRK"s ‘last resort’ and the ‘magic box’ for negotiations. The DPRK is now a "de facto" nuclear state, and we have already lost the momentum to solve the problem peacefully.
In retrospect, the Six-Party Talks has been ‘nothing but the very expensive dinner party.’ It might be useful, at best, in putting off the progress of the DPRK"s nuclear programs. But it has failed: not only integrating the DPRK into the international community and its rules, but also denuclearizing the DPRK.
Now, it seems that the complete and the ultimate solution is a ‘nation building’ process for the DPRK or a unification of the peninsula under the ROK rules. The strategy should be two-folded: the open strategy--continue the Six-Party Talks, engagement, etc. in order not to hard-landing the DPRK; the hidden strategy--accelerate the DPRK"s "nation building" and the reunification of Korea under the system of the liberal democracy and the market economy.
This agreement has a bunch of pitfalls that the DPRK can run off with the carrots--we have seen the same scene again and again in the past negotiations.
- A moratorium, the DPRK said, will be implemented “while productive dialogues continue.” That means the DPRK can break the negotiations down whenever at their will.
- It is unclear that how much unrestricted access the IAEA inspectors will have to all facilities at Yongbyon. Moreover, it should be noted that the UEP inspection is more urgent and important at the areas other than Yongbyon.
- The DPRK, in its unilateral statement, argued that once the talks resumed the issues such as sanctions on the DPRK and provisions of LWRs will be discussed prior to all other issues. The ROK, however, is negative on the LWRs.
- Most importantly, the DPRK will never give up the nukes. They are the DPRK"s ‘last resort’ and the ‘magic box’ for negotiations. The DPRK is now a "de facto" nuclear state, and we have already lost the momentum to solve the problem peacefully.
In retrospect, the Six-Party Talks has been ‘nothing but the very expensive dinner party.’ It might be useful, at best, in putting off the progress of the DPRK"s nuclear programs. But it has failed: not only integrating the DPRK into the international community and its rules, but also denuclearizing the DPRK.
Now, it seems that the complete and the ultimate solution is a ‘nation building’ process for the DPRK or a unification of the peninsula under the ROK rules. The strategy should be two-folded: the open strategy--continue the Six-Party Talks, engagement, etc. in order not to hard-landing the DPRK; the hidden strategy--accelerate the DPRK"s "nation building" and the reunification of Korea under the system of the liberal democracy and the market economy.
목차
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 6자회담의 주요 경과와 전망
Ⅲ. 6자회담 재개 시 주요 쟁점
Ⅳ. 북한 핵문제에 담겨 있는 난점들
V. 결론: 향후 과제와 우리의 전략
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