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학술저널
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한국경영법률학회 경영법률 경영법률 제19권 제1호
발행연도
2008.1
수록면
147 - 171 (25page)

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The term “shark repellent” is defined as a number of measures undertaken by a target corporation to ward off or discourage unwanted or hostile takeover attempts. Many Korean listed corporations have made special amendments to their charters of which main purposes are to make the takeover less attractive or profitable to the acquisitive firm. Typical examples of these antitakeover measures include a super-majority voting provision, golden parachutes, staggered election ward off or discourage unwanted or hostile takeover attempts. Many Korean listed corporations have made special amendments to their charters of which main purposes are to make the takeover less attractive or profitable to the acquisitive firm. Typical examples of these antitakeover measures include a super-majority voting provision, golden parachutes, staggered election of directors, and certain working experience required to be elected as directors. The strategy which requires a vote that is substantially higher than that required by the Commercial Code may make it more difficult for a proposition such as a change of status or the acceptance of a hostile takeover bid to succeed. However, it enables minority shareholders to squeeze majority shareholders out. While golden parachute may function as a heavy burden on the acquisitive firm, they may benefit corporate directors more than the shareholders since they may damage the corporation's financial position. Where there is a upper limit on the number of directors, staggered election of directors works as a efficient defensive strategy. A charter provision which requires directoral candidates to have working experience for some years in the target corporation may deter the corporate raiders from removing all incumbent directors in a short time.of directors, and certain working experience required to be elected as directors. The strategy which requires a vote that is substantially higher than that required by the Commercial Code may make it more difficult for a proposition such as a change of status or the acceptance of a hostile takeover bid to succeed. However, it enables minority shareholders to squeeze majority shareholders out. While golden parachute may function as a heavy burden on the acquisitive firm, they may benefit corporate directors more than the shareholders since they may damage the corporation's financial position. Where there is a upper limit on the number of directors, staggered election of directors works as a efficient defensive strategy. A charter provision which requires directoral candidates to have working experience for some years in the target corporation may deter the corporate raiders from removing all incumbent directors in a short time.
#적대적 M& #amp #A #상어격퇴법 #초다수결의 #황금낙하산 #시차임기제 #hostile takeover #shark repellent #super-majority voting #golden parachute #staggered board

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참고문헌 (27)

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Albert Choi / 2004 / Golden Parachute as a Compensation-Shifting Mechanism, 20 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 170(2004) google schola Douglas R. Cole / 2001 / E-Proxies for Sale? Corporate Vote쵢uying in the Internet Age, 76 Washington Law Review 793(2001) google schola Guhan Subramanian / 2003 / Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 Yale Law Journal 621(2003) google schola Kevin L. Turner / 2006 / Settling The Debate: A Response To Professor Bebchuk's Proposed Reform Of Hostile Takeover Defenses, 57 Alabama Law Review 907(2006) google schola Lucian A. Bebchuk / 2002 / The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stanford Law Review 887(2002) google schola

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