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초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
While China"s military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China"s military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies.
This essay argues that China"s “anti-access capability”--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China"s continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas.
In assessing China"s current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following:
• There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors" navies are weaker still.
• Some have argued that China"s foreign policy behavior apparently became more “assertive” in the 2010s, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as “sovereignty and territorial issues” as well as its newest “core interests.”
• On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA"s own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed conflict from occurring for the past two decades or so.
• While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China"s diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China"s recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context.
• China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China"s unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship.
• For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) “limited defense sufficiency” strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.
This essay argues that China"s “anti-access capability”--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China"s continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas.
In assessing China"s current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following:
• There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors" navies are weaker still.
• Some have argued that China"s foreign policy behavior apparently became more “assertive” in the 2010s, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as “sovereignty and territorial issues” as well as its newest “core interests.”
• On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA"s own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed conflict from occurring for the past two decades or so.
• While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China"s diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China"s recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context.
• China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China"s unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship.
• For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) “limited defense sufficiency” strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.
목차
Ⅰ. 서론 및 문제의 제기
Ⅱ. 중국의 ‘군사적 부상’과 동아시아 안보
Ⅲ. 역내 하부지역과 유사에 대한 함의
Ⅳ. 결론 및 정책적 고려 사항
참고문헌
ABSTRACT
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