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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
Kang, Seokman (Shinhan University)
저널정보
중앙대학교 중앙철학연구소 철학탐구 철학탐구 제68집
발행연도
2022.11
수록면
113 - 149 (37page)

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초록· 키워드

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There are at least two distinct ways to think about visual experience. First, one might simply ask what kind of mental state a visual experience is. This line of thinking concerns the fundamental nature of visual experience, and what it amounts to being perceptually related to the external world. However, there is a more specific way to think about visual experience, that is, how the world visually appears to an ordinary perceiver, or put it more succinctly, its phenomenology. Two major views of visual phenomenology have been proposed, but many of the authors in the debate assume, one way or another, that visual phenomenology can be constitutively determined by both objects and their properties. In this paper, however, I argue that this common assumption about the constitutive nature of visual phenomenology is false. In particular, I argue for the property view, which has it that only properties are its phenomenal constituents. The property view, however, implies a crucial difference between object and property perception because, given the view, only our perceptual relation to properties is phenomenally efficacious. I thus supplement this view with a novel account of object perception and its phenomenal impotence.

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요약문
1. Introduction
2. Cases Against the Object View
3. Cases Against The Property View
4. Object Perception vs. Property Perception
5. The Property View of Visual Phenomenology
6. Conclusion
References

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