이 연구는 일제 전시체제(1931~1945)하 식민지 조선에서 할리우드로 대변되는 외화관람의 의미를 문화연구의 소비실천, 그리고 문화실천의 관점에서 재구성했다. 기존 외화검열 외에 상영제한제를 실시한 1934년부터 1941년 말까지, 그리고 1942년 이후의 전체 대중문화지형을 분석기간으로 설정했고, 배급통제정책에도 불구하고 매출, 관중동원 면에서 급성장을 기록한 외화소비현상을 분석하였다. 문화주의의 접합이론과 맥락화 관점에 입각하여 글로벌 영화사의 주변부시장으로 기능한 조선의 외화배급상황, 외화와 대척관계에 있던 일제 국책영화에 대한 식민지 대중의 수용, 영리를 추구했던 극장자본의 상업주의적 대응과 흥행방식의 변조, 총독부의 이중적이고 모호한 문화정책과 ‘조선특수사정론', 1942년 이후 문화지형의 비정상적 전개등의 요인별로 외화관람과 소비실천의 궤적을 재구성했다. 그리고 외화 전면금지 이후 전시체제에 역행 또는 모순되는 유흥적 연예문화의 성행을 통해 외화관람이 문화실천의 측면을 지니고 있지만 동시에 식민적 근대성의 일단을 내재화하게 되는 양가적 과정임을 드러냈다.
This study explores implications resided in consumption and spectatorship of 'foreign films', Oe-hwa, in war-time colonial Korea from 1934 through 1942. In 1934, Japan attempted the first state intervention into the film market of Korea by the Film Regulations which aimed to lower the total amount of Hollywood films step by step and finally prohibited import and exhibition of it in 1942.
I approached to foreign film consumption in this era in a perspective of cultural studies which has empowered populace by reconstituting everyday practices of theirs as cultural struggles and identity politics against the regime of dominance. I intended to keep distance from the statist and productionist perspectives that have put the colonial state, elites and producers onto the last instance as determining forces of film history, meanwhile audiences and spectators have been presumed as passive objects. I think it is necessary not to miss the point that audience is the one who decide and choose what to see and how much pay for it. Consumption, that is, consuming practice is another instance which cannot be determined directly by production nor by state policies.
The Film Regulations in 1934 was made to control yearly quantity of foreign films to be imported, that were conceived as depicting and disseminating anti-Japan images over the world. American films were seemed as being responsible for the anti-Japan mood at large. However, Hollywood films were desperately sought and desired by colonial Koreans who had ungrounded beliefs in mind that America was the most advanced, rich and strongest country benevolent enough to be able to liberate the weak country like Korea from the hand of the militarist Japan. In consequence, Korean film market had been dominated by the films of Hollywood major studios ever since the early 1920s. It was quite contrary to the market situation of Japan which was named as the only nation Hollywood could not dominate. The national policies on films of the war-time Japan had two-fold objectives. The one was to limit the amount of foreign films to be released, the other was to force Koreans to watch more national policy films called as Culture-Film and news reels depicting Japanese army's victory and soldiers courage and sacrifice in combats in China and Manchuria.
Even though as it was, movie-goers and box-office income of cinema increased rapidly year by year during all the years of war time Korea. I inquired into how those film consumption did possibly happen under such an oppressive wartime circumstances. I discussed factors and forces affected consumption and spectatorship of foreign films. Those factors are: profit-seeking commercialism of exhibiters, mostly Japanese, tried to maintain their profits by introducing new programs like 'Attraction', a sort of variety show, and by extending running hours etc.; Korean masses who had stayed away from Japanese Empire as outsider could not feel war-time crisis as much as Japanese did. Therefore, they kept enjoying watching Hollywood films and going to theaters in order to get sensual and low-quality amusements. National films such as culture-films for education, news reels and Japanese dramatic films were put aside by Koreans. Even Japanese exhibitors in Korea also did not want to show those national films, because these were not attractive to spectators. It does not mean that commercialism of exhibiters and resistant Korean audiences played decisive roles in shaping Korean film market in which Hollywood film was enjoying its hegemonic status.
There are other very decisive and influential factors we should remind. It is important to look into Governance-in-General's role in shaping Hollywood film fever in Korea. Governance-in-General had experienced financial problems during all the years of ruling Korea since 1910, because Japan did not provide it with substantial budget needed in running a colony. Hence it slowed down the pace of execution of film laws in Korea for the sake of maintaining profits of exhibitors that would return to it as tax incomes. The theory of 'Unique Situation of Korea' that was invented and insisted by Governance-in-General itself in order to guarantee Japanese monopolistic capitals in Korea against Japan's war-time policies. It argues that economy and culture of Korea were much lagged and underdeveloped, so she should be treated as a special case to be protected and promoted both commercially and culturally. In addition to these, Japan did not want to make Koreans outraged by depriving them of their most favorite enjoyment. As total prohibition of American and English films came into reality s ince January 1942, musical drama, Akguk(樂劇) began to replace with films and got high popularity among Koreans who could not access to other kinds of entertainments. Regular musical drama of the era was constituted of erotic dances, jazzy popular songs, short plays and comic chat. It had no other function but to make spectators pleasant and distractive away from reality. It means it was not in harmonious with war-time regulations and policies.
In a perspective of post-colonialism, I argue that those cultural practices of seeking hypersensual amusement and visual pleasure which seems constituting one of peculiar attributes of Korean popular culture as we see in current TV programming should be defined as a symptom or manifestation of colonial modernity.