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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
박병찬 (국방대학교)
저널정보
국방부 군사편찬연구소 군사 군사 제109호
발행연도
2018.12
수록면
81 - 113 (33page)

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The United States has not systematically organized and developed experiences and lessons of failure since the failure of the counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War more than three decades ago. Since then, the United States has been confronted with a new war that was unexpected, though on May 1, 2003, when President Bush declared that "major battles in Iraq were over", the war seemed to be a successful ending. The response of the US military responding to the insurgent"s insurgency was still limited to the conventional way of conducting combat, so it was once again a failure.
Thus, this study will analyze the factors that led to the failure of the United States to revive the counterinsurgency from the perspective of "Othernization" of Orientalism. The United States looked at Iraq with distorted views created by it"s "Othernization" of Iraq and Iraq people. In the end, it was separated from indigenous inhabitants and approach from the viewpoint that it could not bring back the support of residents.
Based on the four battle cases that took place during the Iraq war for analysis, we will compare the four failure factors to see what factors have failed or succeeded in the battle. As the comparative factors, the first, "Execution of the operation centered on the sweeping", the second, "The operation without consideration of the civilian damage", the third, ‘Execution of the US military independent operation’, and the fourth, ‘Execution of the large conventional military operation’.
As a result of analysis of the factors of failure of the US Army"s counterinsurgency, the factors that can be generalized as common cause of the counterinsurgency failure in Iraq are the ‘execution of the operation centered on the sweeping’ and ‘the operation without considering the civilian damage.’ On the other hand, considering that the "large-scale conventional military operation" was a failure factor of the first Falluja battle and joint strike operation, considering that it was a successful operation even though it was applied in the second Falluja battle, ‘large-scale conventional military operation" did not become a necessary factor for the failure of the counterinsurgency.

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1. 서론
2. 이론적 검토 및 연구방법
3. 이라크 전쟁 內 전투사례 비교 분석
4. 대반란전 실패 요인 분석
5. 결론
〈참고문헌〉
〈Abstract〉

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