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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국경영법률학회 경영법률 경영법률 제20권 제2호
발행연도
2010.1
수록면
381 - 416 (36page)

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The Ministry of Justice has opened the draft amendments to the Commercial Code to the public, which are intented to adopt a poison pill against hostile takeovers. The poison pill refers a defensive tactic that curbs hostile takeover bids by making the target corporation unattractive to the potential acquirer. According to the draft amendments, a poison pill can be used only in the instance where the issuance of warrants are written into the articles of incorporation and the board of directors can decide whether to grant warrants to existing shareholders. The articles may provide that the target corporation treats shareholders on an unequal basis even if the issuance of warrants dilutes the raider's holdings. However, some kinds of loopholes remain in the draft amendments. Firstly, the government's drive to adopt the pill seems that Korea is likely to close the door of the market for corporate control to foreigners. Secondly, since the draft amendments use some abstract terms such as the corporate value and does not provide the concrete guideline for the board's prerogative of granting and redeeming warrants, the board's decisions may be under the court's ex post facto scrutiny. Thirdly, it can not be anticipated for the target corporation to cancel the issued warrants voluntarily because the re-incorporation of the poison pill into the articles after its previous cancellation is not an easy work. Fourthly, although shareholders are granted an injunction against the issuance of new shares, the newly- issued shares are not retrospectively null and void.

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