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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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In recent years, we have discussed what to introduce various defensive tactics with our being conscious that defenses against hostile takeovers is not enough in Korea. Among the defenses, the poison pill has received attention in that it is cheap and effective. To introduce the poison pill, we have to check whether it will violate the principle of the equal treatment of shareholders (the Principle).
On the one hand. The poison pill is a strategy used by corporations to discourage hostile M&A by another company. The target company attempts to make its stock less attractive to the acquirer. There are two types of poison pills: A "flip-in" allows existing shareholders (except the acquirer) to buy more shares at a discount. The "flip-over" allows stockholders to buy the acquirer s shares at a discounted price after the merger. By purchasing more shares cheaply (flip-in), existing shareholders (except the acquired get instant profits and, more importantly, they dilute the shares held by the acquirer. As a result, the acquirer's takeover attempt is made more difficult and expensive. The most important factor in the poison pill is to discriminate against the acquirer.
On the other hand. the Principle means that company shall ensure equal treatment of all shareholders who are in the same position. But the Principle has no provision in the Korean Commercial Law, it functions as the mandatory rule over all areas of the corporate law, so articles of association. resolution of general meeting of stockholders, and director's execution violating the Principle are invalid with no exception. The Principle has been very strictly interpreted. As a result, the target company's discrimination against the acquirer violates the Principle.
To introduce the poison pill, the legal problem caused by the target company's discrimination against the acquirer should be solved. For solving the problem is not in strictly interpreting the Principle, but in flexibly interpreting the Principle. It requires that we should interpret the Principle flexibly in issuance of new type of shares. If the target company's discrimination against the acquirer has the legitimacy of purpose and the proportion of means, it is not violated in the Principle. By the way, it is enacted that a Commercial Code revising draft in November 2008 rules out the Principle, but the poison pill can be introduced by the flexible interpretation of the Principle.
On the one hand. The poison pill is a strategy used by corporations to discourage hostile M&A by another company. The target company attempts to make its stock less attractive to the acquirer. There are two types of poison pills: A "flip-in" allows existing shareholders (except the acquirer) to buy more shares at a discount. The "flip-over" allows stockholders to buy the acquirer s shares at a discounted price after the merger. By purchasing more shares cheaply (flip-in), existing shareholders (except the acquired get instant profits and, more importantly, they dilute the shares held by the acquirer. As a result, the acquirer's takeover attempt is made more difficult and expensive. The most important factor in the poison pill is to discriminate against the acquirer.
On the other hand. the Principle means that company shall ensure equal treatment of all shareholders who are in the same position. But the Principle has no provision in the Korean Commercial Law, it functions as the mandatory rule over all areas of the corporate law, so articles of association. resolution of general meeting of stockholders, and director's execution violating the Principle are invalid with no exception. The Principle has been very strictly interpreted. As a result, the target company's discrimination against the acquirer violates the Principle.
To introduce the poison pill, the legal problem caused by the target company's discrimination against the acquirer should be solved. For solving the problem is not in strictly interpreting the Principle, but in flexibly interpreting the Principle. It requires that we should interpret the Principle flexibly in issuance of new type of shares. If the target company's discrimination against the acquirer has the legitimacy of purpose and the proportion of means, it is not violated in the Principle. By the way, it is enacted that a Commercial Code revising draft in November 2008 rules out the Principle, but the poison pill can be introduced by the flexible interpretation of the Principle.
목차
Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 주주평등원칙의 의의
Ⅲ. 포이즌 필과 주주평등의 원칙
Ⅳ. 맺음말
參考文獻
〈Abstract〉
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