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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
이진명 (한국외국어대학교)
저널정보
국방대학교 국가안전보장문제연구소 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs The Korean Journal of Security Affairs 제25권 제1호
발행연도
2020.1
수록면
70 - 91 (22page)

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This article examines whether China’s extended-deterrence is reliable over its military allies or trading partners. I argue that China under authoritarian regime and limited deterrence policy is unlikely to provide its military allies or trading partners with credible extended-deterrence. Employing the logit regression analysis on enduring rivalry data set, I have found that military or economic ties with China are less likely to inhibit conflicts for the period of 1950-2000. In theory, the results imply that retaliatory threats of China to protect their military allies or trading partners are unlikely to be credible because of its limited deterrence policy and its authoritarian leaders who do not face harsh consequences for deception, ultimately putting an end to their political careers. The findings have significant practical implications. During the Cold War and afterwards, rather than remaining loyal to its allies, China has willfully joined the U.S. bandwagon to achieve rapid economic growth and military build-up. In the lack of its alliance credibility, China is unlikely to facilitate N. Korea to undergo complete denuclearization, even more clarifying N. Korea’s motivation to develop nuclear weapons and missile capabilities as a deterrent purpose for national security. Accordingly, the U.S. can find itself a primary determinant for the successful nuclear bargain with N. Korea, at least not in conclusive support of China

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