기업이 자기주식을 매입하기 위해서는 시장에서 직접 취득하는 방법과 신탁계약 등을 통한 간접취득 방법 중 하나를 선택하게 된다. 직접취득의 경우 3개월 이내에 반드시 취득하도록 의무화되어 있으나 간접취득의 경우에는 신탁계약기관이 보통 2년 이내에 자유롭게 취득할 수 있도록 하고 있다. 또한, 간접취득 기업들은 반드시 취득해야 한다는 의무가 없을 뿐만 아니라, 언제든지 처분도 자유롭게 할 수 있다. 이러한 제도적 특성 때문에, 기업의 매입 방식 선택은 투자자들에게 중요한 의미를 주고 있다. 선행연구에서는 주로 자기주식 취득이 주주의 부에 미치는 효과만을 비교 분석하고 있다. 이에 대비하여, 본 연구는 두 방식의 제도적 특징을 구체화하여 이들 두 방식의 선택 결정 요인들을 식별하고, 취득 방법 및 실제 취득 비율의 결정 과정에서 발생 가능한 기회주의적 행동 가설을 실증적으로 검증한다는 점에서 선행연구와 차별된다. 본 연구는 2000년부터 2006년 동안에 한국에서 실시한 직접취득과 간접취득 기업들을 분석하였다. 분석결과, 첫째, 직접취득 기업들은 간접취득 기업들에 비하여 재무적 유연성이 더 높았다. 상대적으로 현금흐름이 더 양호하고 부채비율은 낮으며 수익성은 좋으나 성장성은 더 낮았다. 두 번째로 직접취득에 비하여 간접취득의 경우 실제 취득을 기회주의적으로 결정하고 있었다. 직접취득 기업들은 목표취득비율 대비 평균 96% 이상을 실제로 취득하였지만, 간접취득 기업들은 목표 취득비율의 평균 72.98%(유가증권시장), 67.34%(코스닥시장) 정도만 실제로 취득하였다. 마지막으로 직접취득이 주주의 부에 유의하게 더 큰 영향을 주는 것으로 나타나고 있지만, 실제매입비율로 통제한 이후에는 취득방법 더미 변수의 유의성이 없었다. 즉, 기업에서 간접취득으로 목표매입비율을 공시할 때, 투자자들은 목표매입비율의 신호가 거짓신호의 가능성을 갖고 있는 것으로 받아들인다. 따라서 누적비정상수익률을 종속변수로 한 회귀분석에서, 목표매입비율 변수를 설명변수로 포함할 때에는 취득방법 변수가 유의한 영향을 주고 있으나, 실제매입비율 변수를 포함할 때에는 취득방법 더미변수가 유의하지 않다.
For conducting stock repurchases, firms are supposed to choose one of the repurchasing methods between direct open market stock repurchase and indirect stock repurchase through trust contracts with financial institutions. The regulation governing direct stock repurchases requires firms to complete the repurchases within three months from the date of announcement, but the rule on indirect repurchases allows financial institutions (or firms) to repurchase as well as reissue stocks anytime within two years. In particular, the firms choosing indirect repurchases have no obligation to complete repurchases within the contract period. They may reissue the repurchased stocks also. These differences in regulation on repurchasing methods have significant implications on the value of firms. From those differences, we can hypothesize that those firms which are more financially flexible are more likely to choose direct open market stock repurchases than indirect stock repurchases. Without financial flexibility, firms cannot commit themselves to complete the repurchases within three months. We can also make the hypothesis that the fraction of shares repurchased in the indirect stock repurchases is Lower than that in the direct stock repurchases. That is, the firms which choose the indirect stock repurchases are more likely to repurchase the shares opportunistically. Previous studies on this topic have simply analyzed the shareholder wealth effects of two different methods. Extending the previous analyses, this study examines the determinants of decision making on repurchasing methods, and also tests the hypothesis of opportunistic behavior which may occur in the process of firms` decision making on the targeted fraction of shares to be repurchased and actual fraction of shares repurchased. This study investigates 877 stock repurchase disclosures from January 2000 to December 2006 in the Korean security market. The total sample consists of 404 direct stock repurchases (open market stock repurchases) and 323 indirect stock repurchases through trust contracts. We find the following results. First, the firms which choose the direct stock repurchases have significantly higher financial flexibility than the firms which use the indirect stock repurchases. Those firms using open market repurchases have higher cash flow and profitability ratios, and lower debt and growth ratios than those firms choosing indirect stock repurchases. Second, those firms choosing indirect repurchases repurchase the shares more opportunistically than those firms using direct repurchases. The actual fraction of the number of shares repurchased over the number of shares announced in the direct repurchases is more than 96%. However, it is 72.98% (in the stock market) and 67.34% (in the KOSDAQ market) in the indirect stock repurchases. Finally, that the firms choosing the indirect stock repurchases may repurchase the shares more opportunistically is reflected in the stock prices of these firms. To evaluate how the information about opportunistic behaviors are revealed in the stock prices, we regress the announcement period Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) on proxies for theories of stock repurchases and control variables. When the targeted fraction of shares to be repurchased is included in the regression models, the dummy variable of repurchasing method is significant. However, when the actual fraction of the number of shares repurchased is included in the regression, the method dummy is not significant. The results suggest that when firms announce the targeted fraction of shares to be repurchased in the cases of indirect repurchases, investors can interpret that the targeted fractions may convey a false signal and the repurchasing method has a significant effect on stock prices. In contrast, investors regard the actual fractions of shares repurchased as reliable signals. Therefore, when the actual fraction of shares repurchased is included in regression model, the dummy variable of repurchasing method is not significant.