지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
The purpose of this study was to investigate the command system and mobilization patterns of the local forces in Jeolla province with the activities to defend the Gyeongsang rebel forces` advance to Jeolla Province from the historical perspective of military system. For this purpose, I searched the studies about the local systems and military ones to review the response system to rebellion in Jella province. And then, using "the official document file of the Musin Rebellion(『戊申別謄錄』)", which included the reports from local governors during Musin rebellion, I could confirm how the local governors responded to the rebel forces from Gyeongsang under the military system at that time.
In the beginning of 18th century, the command system of regional military consisted of provincial governor(監司), provincial military commander(兵使), local divisional commander(營將), and district magistrate(守令) in order. In addition, the troops that could be mobilized in the Jeolla province were the ivory soldiers(牙兵) of headquarters of the provincial governor(監營), the personal troops(親兵) of provincial military commander’s headquarters(兵營) and the regimental troops(束伍軍) in local divisional commander’s garrison(鎭營). But as the cases of exemption of military service were spreaded out at that time, it is impossible to estimate the number of soldiers to have been mobilized from the headquarters of the provincial governor(監營) and the provincial military commander’s headquarter. However, the maximum troops that could be nominally mobilized by the local divisional commander of Unbong(雲峯) included around 5,000 people, 2 companies of horsemen, 34 companies of infantry and so on.
The news that the rebellion occurred in Chongju(淸州) on March 15 was delivered to Jeolla province on the evening of 18th. In response to this, Jeolla province mobilized military forces. In the middle of it, the news that the rebellion in Gyeongsang Province occurred on 20th was delivered to Jeolla Province on the 21st. From the moment, Son Myeongdae(孫命大), county magistrate of Ungong and local divisional commander, made a reconnaissance to confirm the rebellion and urgently mobilized the troops to defend the Hill of Pallyang(八良峙), a very important strategic point.
However, Kim Yu(金濰), district magistrate of Namwon(南原) refused because there was no official order by royal court, and it was not until he received the order of provincial governor that he supported soldiers. Wha`s worse, it was not easy to gather soldiers quickly, so that only 50% of their troops were gathered on the 27th. The next day, on the 28th, the rebel occupied Hamyang(咸陽), nearby area, and proceeded to the Hill of Pallyang. But the rebels retreated at dawn on the 30th after the provincial troops preoccupied the highlands first.
After examining the response system to rebellion and the mobilization of troops, it is certain that there was a problem in the commander`s capacity due to the confusion of the command system resulting from the structural defects of the system, and the military command of the non-specialist. Also, the troops couldn`t be quickly mobilized, and the mobilized troops were only 2/3 against the nominal number. This shows that the regional response system to the rebellion had already been largely collapsed, and that the institutional and structural problems had to be supplemented by individual capabilities.
In the beginning of 18th century, the command system of regional military consisted of provincial governor(監司), provincial military commander(兵使), local divisional commander(營將), and district magistrate(守令) in order. In addition, the troops that could be mobilized in the Jeolla province were the ivory soldiers(牙兵) of headquarters of the provincial governor(監營), the personal troops(親兵) of provincial military commander’s headquarters(兵營) and the regimental troops(束伍軍) in local divisional commander’s garrison(鎭營). But as the cases of exemption of military service were spreaded out at that time, it is impossible to estimate the number of soldiers to have been mobilized from the headquarters of the provincial governor(監營) and the provincial military commander’s headquarter. However, the maximum troops that could be nominally mobilized by the local divisional commander of Unbong(雲峯) included around 5,000 people, 2 companies of horsemen, 34 companies of infantry and so on.
The news that the rebellion occurred in Chongju(淸州) on March 15 was delivered to Jeolla province on the evening of 18th. In response to this, Jeolla province mobilized military forces. In the middle of it, the news that the rebellion in Gyeongsang Province occurred on 20th was delivered to Jeolla Province on the 21st. From the moment, Son Myeongdae(孫命大), county magistrate of Ungong and local divisional commander, made a reconnaissance to confirm the rebellion and urgently mobilized the troops to defend the Hill of Pallyang(八良峙), a very important strategic point.
However, Kim Yu(金濰), district magistrate of Namwon(南原) refused because there was no official order by royal court, and it was not until he received the order of provincial governor that he supported soldiers. Wha`s worse, it was not easy to gather soldiers quickly, so that only 50% of their troops were gathered on the 27th. The next day, on the 28th, the rebel occupied Hamyang(咸陽), nearby area, and proceeded to the Hill of Pallyang. But the rebels retreated at dawn on the 30th after the provincial troops preoccupied the highlands first.
After examining the response system to rebellion and the mobilization of troops, it is certain that there was a problem in the commander`s capacity due to the confusion of the command system resulting from the structural defects of the system, and the military command of the non-specialist. Also, the troops couldn`t be quickly mobilized, and the mobilized troops were only 2/3 against the nominal number. This shows that the regional response system to the rebellion had already been largely collapsed, and that the institutional and structural problems had to be supplemented by individual capabilities.
목차
1. 서론
2. 전라도 지역의 반란 대응체계
3. 반란 대응체계의 실제 운용 양상
4. 결론 : 전라도 지역 반란 대응체계의 문제
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2019-390-000577595