지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 연구보고서
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2007.6
- 수록면
- 1 - 129 (129page)
이용수
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
One of the differences between Customs Union(CU) and free trade agreement (FTA) is the authority to change tariffs on imports from non-member countries. CU member countries introduce common tariff rates against non-member countries, and they cannot change tariff rates voluntarily without prior consultation with other member countries. CU also needs ROO during the transitional period toward the implementation of common external tariffs. However, FTA member countries can set tariff rates (not higher than WTO bound rates) independently. Because tariff rates of the member countries of an FTA are different, trade deflection can occur. Trade deflection means that a good imported via a low tariff FTA member country is re-exported into a country with high tariff without paying tariffs. In order to prevent trade deflection, FTA member countries introduce specific rules, regulating that only the goods satisfying the rules be given preferential treatments in terms of tariffs. These rules are called rules of origin (ROO).
Stringent ROOcan discourage exporters not to take advantage of tariff preferences provided by FTAs, undercutting the economic gains of FTAs. As different ROOs are introduced by overlapping FTAs, the spaghetti-bowl problem may be present, enforcing dampening trade effects of the ROO. Because of the experimental operating difficulties of the ROO, there is alimited numbers of researches on the stringent ROO effects on trade. Examples are Cadet, et al (2002), Carrere and de Melo(2004), Kunimoto and Sawchuk(2005), Herin(1986) and Krueger (1995).
There are 3 criteria for defining ROO in FTAs. The first criterion is Change in Tariff Classification (CTC) or "tariff line shift." CTC is widely used in regional trading agreements (RTAs), and is preferred by the World Customs Organization (WCO), which promotes the simplification and harmonization of ROO. CTC is based on the Harmonized System (HS), classifying goods at a two-digit chapter level, a four-digit heading level, a six-digit subheading level or an eight (ten)-digit level. The second rule is the requirement of Regional (local) Value Contents (RVC), implying the requirement that the product should acquire a minimum regional value in exporting country or a region of a RTA. The rule of regional value contents can be considered in various ways such as export value, import value and value of parts included in an article. However, we do not consider these separately, regarding all methods as regional value contents. The third rule is the requirement of Technical Process (TP), which requires a specific production process for an item. Each criterion has merits as well as demerits, as shown in Table 1. The CTC approach is relatively simple in requiring the comparison between the tariff line of a final product and those of intermediate materials, but it bears an intrinsic problem in that the HS system does not follow industrial classifications for many products.
ROOs act like trade barriers, since they cause extra costs in production and management. Producers/exporters need to pay costs for calculating production costs and producing bookkeeping related documents. Regarding empirical research on administrative costs in a FTA and costs of preparing documents for preferential treatment, refer to Koskinen (1983) and Herin (1986), respectively. Also, extra costs will be incurred in complying with technical and specific process and regional value contents as specified in the ROO protocol, and these costs will be added to the prices of export goods. Several empirical researches on the costs of stringent ROO under NAFTA show substantial costs to intra-regional traders and producers. For example, Cadot et al (2002) found that theutilization rate of NAFTA preferences is as low as 64% due to stringent ROO in part. Regarding more information on the costs of ROO, refer to Estevadeordal (2003, pp.8-9).
East Asian countries have short history about FTAs, and politically strong agriculture sector, which interrupt discussion on the conclusion of FTAs in various ways. Governments in the region are not quite active in moving toward the bandwagon of global trend of economic integration, although getting involved with the negotiation of FTAs. Therefore, these countries tend to introduce restrictive ROO.
Korea is promoting a FTA with US, and it is known that both parties are supportive of restrictive ROO in the bilateral FTA. The FTAs by Korea with Chile, Singapore, and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) have similar ROOs, which are based on the NAFTA ROO. Therefore, it is highly possible that the two countries agree on a NAFTA ROO, which is one of most stringent ROO in FTAs. It is recommended that Korea and US should introduce a neutral and loose type of ROO in their FTA for the higher economic gains.
Stringent ROOcan discourage exporters not to take advantage of tariff preferences provided by FTAs, undercutting the economic gains of FTAs. As different ROOs are introduced by overlapping FTAs, the spaghetti-bowl problem may be present, enforcing dampening trade effects of the ROO. Because of the experimental operating difficulties of the ROO, there is alimited numbers of researches on the stringent ROO effects on trade. Examples are Cadet, et al (2002), Carrere and de Melo(2004), Kunimoto and Sawchuk(2005), Herin(1986) and Krueger (1995).
There are 3 criteria for defining ROO in FTAs. The first criterion is Change in Tariff Classification (CTC) or "tariff line shift." CTC is widely used in regional trading agreements (RTAs), and is preferred by the World Customs Organization (WCO), which promotes the simplification and harmonization of ROO. CTC is based on the Harmonized System (HS), classifying goods at a two-digit chapter level, a four-digit heading level, a six-digit subheading level or an eight (ten)-digit level. The second rule is the requirement of Regional (local) Value Contents (RVC), implying the requirement that the product should acquire a minimum regional value in exporting country or a region of a RTA. The rule of regional value contents can be considered in various ways such as export value, import value and value of parts included in an article. However, we do not consider these separately, regarding all methods as regional value contents. The third rule is the requirement of Technical Process (TP), which requires a specific production process for an item. Each criterion has merits as well as demerits, as shown in Table 1. The CTC approach is relatively simple in requiring the comparison between the tariff line of a final product and those of intermediate materials, but it bears an intrinsic problem in that the HS system does not follow industrial classifications for many products.
ROOs act like trade barriers, since they cause extra costs in production and management. Producers/exporters need to pay costs for calculating production costs and producing bookkeeping related documents. Regarding empirical research on administrative costs in a FTA and costs of preparing documents for preferential treatment, refer to Koskinen (1983) and Herin (1986), respectively. Also, extra costs will be incurred in complying with technical and specific process and regional value contents as specified in the ROO protocol, and these costs will be added to the prices of export goods. Several empirical researches on the costs of stringent ROO under NAFTA show substantial costs to intra-regional traders and producers. For example, Cadot et al (2002) found that theutilization rate of NAFTA preferences is as low as 64% due to stringent ROO in part. Regarding more information on the costs of ROO, refer to Estevadeordal (2003, pp.8-9).
East Asian countries have short history about FTAs, and politically strong agriculture sector, which interrupt discussion on the conclusion of FTAs in various ways. Governments in the region are not quite active in moving toward the bandwagon of global trend of economic integration, although getting involved with the negotiation of FTAs. Therefore, these countries tend to introduce restrictive ROO.
Korea is promoting a FTA with US, and it is known that both parties are supportive of restrictive ROO in the bilateral FTA. The FTAs by Korea with Chile, Singapore, and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) have similar ROOs, which are based on the NAFTA ROO. Therefore, it is highly possible that the two countries agree on a NAFTA ROO, which is one of most stringent ROO in FTAs. It is recommended that Korea and US should introduce a neutral and loose type of ROO in their FTA for the higher economic gains.
목차
제1장 서론
제2장 우리나라의 FTA 추진현황과 평가
제3장 FTA 원산지 기준의 내용
제4장 미국 FTA 원산지기준 분석
제5장 FTA 원산지기준 분석 방법론과 주요 연구결과
제6장 FTA 원산지기준의 파급영향
제7장 정책시사점
참고문헌
부록 [FTA 원산지기준 영문 및 국문]
Abstract
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2013-000-001446561